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In a variety of electoral situations, incumbents win substantially more than half of
the time. This is sometimes referred to as an incumbency advantage. This paper
investigates the sources of the incumbency advantage in the U.S. Senate, where
incumbents win almost 80% of the time.
While many explanations have been posited to explain the incumbency advan-
tage, including pork-barrel spending, media coverage, and incumbent visibility, one
important explanation is that some of the incumbency advantage is due to a selec-
tion eﬀect: becoming an incumbent requires winning, and winning candidates will
tend to be of relatively high quality. In this case the incumbency advantage is not
due to any direct beneﬁt of incumbency but is rather a consequence of the diﬀerent
distribution of quality for incumbents. The goal of this paper is to empirically disen-
tangle the selection eﬀect from other sources of incumbency advantage, principally
the eﬀect of tenure and the fact that the quality of challengers facing incumbents
running for reelection may be low relative to the quality of candidates in open seat
elections (that is, elections without incumbents).
We formulate a simple model of voter decisions for candidates incorporating
selection and other eﬀects that can explain the incumbency advantage. The model
implies that the tenure of the incumbent and the history of the seat following an
open seat election (e.g., how many terms were served by each candidate who was
later defeated by another candidate) will inﬂuence the probability of reelection in
diﬀerent ways depending on the relative importance of selection and other eﬀects.
We ﬁrst examine what simple counts from U.S. Senate data of winning probabilities
by incumbent’s tenure and terms since an open seat election imply about the sources
of the incumbency advantage. To more precisely understand the implications of the
data, we structurally estimate the parameters of the model, and use the estimated
model to examine the relative importance of the diﬀerent sources of incumbency
advantage.
The model of voters and candidates we present in Section 3, though stylized,
seeks to capture some of the basic forces of incumbency advantage. In our model,
1voters obtain utility from their elected oﬃcial through two sources. First, each
candidate has a permanent, idiosyncratic quality, which voters value. Second, voters
value the tenure of their elected oﬃcial. There are several possible sources of tenure
eﬀects. Elected oﬃcials may learn on the job, they may use tenure to achieve better
status within the Senate, or they may use the exposure of incumbency to their
advantage in elections. It also could be that candidates become out-of-step with
their constituents or that their skills deteriorate over time. We do not attempt to
separate these diﬀerent sources of the tenure eﬀects, as it is beyond the scope of our
model and data. Instead, we simply seek to evaluate the importance and variation
of tenure eﬀects, and to separate them from the selection eﬀect. Importantly, we do
not restrict the tenure eﬀects to be increasing in tenure or follow any other pattern.
We model voters in each senatorial seat as identical dynamically optimizing
agents. Voters observe the permanent quality of two current candidates and then
elect one of them. Permanent candidate quality is drawn from a ﬁxed distribution,
which varies depending on whether the election is an open seat election or one where
an incumbent is running. Once quality is drawn, the only change in the utility ﬂow
from a candidate over his career is his tenure eﬀect, which moves in an identical
way across elected oﬃcials. An incumbent leaves the Senate with an exogenous exit
probability that depends on tenure. As such, we do not account for the selection
bias that may result from senators choosing when to retire based on their electoral
prospects.1
We base our estimation on U.S. Senate data since 1914, which marks the start of
the elected senate. Our data contain the history of senatorial seats, recording how
candidates came to oﬃce, how long they served in oﬃce and the reason they left
oﬃce. Conditional on a given vector of structural parameters, the solution to the
1 Although we are not aware of any evidence on the exogeneity of retirement from the Senate,
Kiewiet and Zeng (1993) ﬁnd that age is the most important determinant of the retirement decision
for House representatives, with scandals a distant second. Indicators of quality such as chairmanship
of a committee, party leadership, or the victory margin in the previous election are not statistically
signiﬁcant. These ﬁndings support our choice of exogenous exit probabilities to the extent that
they apply to the behavior of senators. Ansolabehere and Snyder Jr. (2004), using term limits as
an instrumental variable, also ﬁnd no evidence that candidates are strategic in their retirement
decisions.
2voter’s dynamic choice problem implies a probability distribution over the possible
electoral histories of a senatorial seat. We derive this distribution and use it to
estimate the parameters of the model with the method of maximum likelihood.
The model allows us to identify selection and tenure eﬀects separately in a rel-
atively intuitive way. The key feature of the data that allows identiﬁcation is that
two senators with identical tenure could have important diﬀerences in their electoral
history and the winning probability of an incumbent depends on the entire history
of the seat. For instance, a one-term incumbent could have beaten a two-term in-
cumbent, or he could have beaten a ﬁve-term incumbent. If ﬁve-term incumbents
almost never lose, then the econometrician’s posterior distribution of permanent
quality for the one-term incumbent who beats a ﬁve-term incumbent will be diﬀer-
ent from the posterior distribution for a one-term incumbent who beats a two-term
incumbent. If selection based on candidate quality is an important determinant
of the incumbency advantage, then these two incumbents would have quite diﬀer-
ent probabilities of reelection despite their identical tenure. Thus, the importance
of selection will be identiﬁed based on how the electoral history aﬀects reelection
probabilities, conditioning on incumbent tenure.
We can understand some of the impact that these basic forces of identiﬁcation
will have on our predicted sources of incumbency advantage by examining the win-
ning probabilities in the data by tenure and terms since an open seat election.2
The data reveal that incumbent senators who initially won an open seat election
have roughly an 80% probability of winning reelection in every election after the
ﬁrst election. As selection implies increasing reelection probabilities if tenure eﬀects
are constant or increasing in tenure, the constant probabilities suggest that tenure
eﬀects cannot be increasing in tenure. Comparisons of reelection probabilities of
candidates with identical tenure who diﬀer by whether or not they won open seat
elections suggest that the quality of candidates is higher in open seat elections than
in other elections.
In order to precisely quantify the sources of the incumbency advantage, we turn
2 These counts are shown in Table 1 in Section 5.1.
3to our structural model. Our structural estimation results show that tenure eﬀects
are negative or small and that two other factors explain the incumbency advantage.
First, incumbents are of higher average quality due to selection eﬀects. Second, on
average, incumbents face a weaker pool of challengers than do candidates running
for an open seat. In our data, incumbents win 78% of the time. Without diﬀerences
in the distributions of candidate quality across elections, incumbents would only
win about 63% of the time, while with no diﬀerences in quality whatsoever, any
candidate would have a 50% chance of winning any election. This suggests that
candidate heterogeneity accounts for about half of the incumbency advantage.
Our base speciﬁcation is very parsimonious in that it does not use characteris-
tics of candidates, elections, states, or time. We realize that there are important
diﬀerences across these variables that might inﬂuence the incumbency advantage.
We make this choice because even this simple model yields intuitive testable pre-
dictions as to the sources of incumbency bias, and because predicted moments from
the structural estimation, based on reelection probabilities by candidate tenure and
history, ﬁt the data reasonably well.
However, as a robustness check, in Section 5.3 we specify models with unob-
served heterogeneity where the parameters vary across time and regions.3 This
speciﬁcation would allow for the possibility that some states have huge, positive
tenure eﬀects (e.g., “safe” states where, for instance, a candidate of the prevailing
political party has an inherent advantage), while others have moderately negative
tenure eﬀects. While the point estimates we computed do suggest the possibility of
such a dichotomy, a likelihood ratio test reveals that this speciﬁcation does not sig-
niﬁcantly improve the model’s ability to explain the data relative to the speciﬁcation
without unobserved heterogeneity.
3 Our speciﬁcation follows Heckman and Singer (1984).
42 Relationship to the existing literature
Starting in the 1970s, a vast literature has developed that has tried to quantify
incumbency advantages.4 Early studies regressed the winning probability on an
incumbency dummy. As we discussed above, interpreting a positive coeﬃcient in
this regression as a tenure eﬀect is problematic because the positive coeﬃcient may
be due to a selection eﬀect. The ﬁrst method to try to separate the tenure and
selection eﬀects deﬁned the tenure eﬀect as the diﬀerence between the vote share
that a senator earned in his second and ﬁrst elections. This measure became known
as the sophomore surge.5 Gelman and King (1990) pointed out that the sophomore
surge approach also suﬀers from selection bias because a candidate who is elected
would disproportionately have had a good draw in his ﬁrst election, that may be
idiosyncratic to the ﬁrst election. They developed a reduced-form least squares
method that helps mitigate this selection bias. Levitt and Wolfram (1997) apply a
Heckman-style correction to the sophomore surge to further mitigate the Gelman
and King (1990) selection bias. Separately, Levitt and Wolfram (1997) attempt to
separate the sources of incumbency advantage into increased incumbent quality and
decreased challenger quality, by considering pairs of elections where the same two
candidates face each other.
Our paper builds on these earlier papers, in that we recognize, and attempt to
control for, the problem of selection bias that is inherent in an electoral system. Our
model incorporates the fact that an incumbent who won had a positive idiosyncratic
shock in the ﬁrst period, as in Gelman and King (1990). The idiosyncratic shock
occurs because the winner of an open seat election likely faced a competitor whose
quality was less than the average candidate quality in an open seat election, but will
face a challenger of average quality in his second election. As in Levitt and Wolfram
(1997), we consider speciﬁcations where the new candidate density can diﬀer based
4 Most studies use House election data, which contain a larger number of elections. They
typically regress winning probabilities on a set of regressors. See the references in the surveys by
Cover and Mayhew (1977), Fiorina (1989), and Mayhew (1974). For more recent studies, see also
Ansolabehere and Snyder Jr. (2002), Ansolabehere and Snyder Jr. (2004), Cox and Katz (1996),
and Lee (2001), together with the other references cited in this section.
5 See Erikson (1971), Cover (1977), Gelman and King (1990) and references therein.
5on whether the candidate is in an open seat election or not.
Our approach diﬀers from the approach of these papers in several important
ways. First, we estimate parameters that are fully consistent with an optimizing
model of voter behavior. Thus, there are no longer any questions as to whether
our estimates suﬀer from selection bias, conditional on our model being accurate.
Second, our model is identiﬁed by the entire history of electoral outcomes since the
open seat election, and not just by the data from the current election.6 This allows
us to identify our parameters of interest without using the limited (and potentially
biased) information available from when pairs of candidates face each other multiple
times. Third, our model generalizes the sophomore surge approach, in that it allows
for tenure eﬀects, which we can estimate separately from the eﬀect of selection, by
using the entire history of outcomes. Fourth, we use data from the U.S. Senate,
and not the U.S. House of Representatives. This allows us to avoid having to deal
with the problems inherent in redistricting.7 Fifth, we do not include many of the
covariates used in earlier studies. We made this choice because we need to keep the
number of state variables to a minimum in order to estimate the dynamic model.
Finally, we use data only on election wins and not on vote shares. We made this
decision in order to estimate parameters that are consistent with a well-speciﬁed
model and because vote shares are more likely to be biased by endogenous challenger
quality and eﬀort, which we do not model.
Because of these diﬀerences in our approach, our results diﬀer substantially from
these other studies. We believe that an advantage to our approach is that the factors
in the data that generate our results are readily apparent and broadly present in
the Senate data, as we discuss in Section 5.1.
A related literature has structurally estimated candidate career decisions to retire
or face reelection. Both strands of the literature attempt to predict reelection prob-
abilities. Diermeier et al. (2002) estimate a model where candidate career decisions
6 In this way, our model relates to Samuelson (1987), who ﬁrst recognized the importance of
the entire history of a seat in evaluating incumbency advantage.
7 Redistricting is problematic because it is diﬃcult to deﬁne incumbency and electoral outcomes
in the case where one district is formed from parts of more than one district.
6are endogenous but reelection probabilities are exogenous. In contrast, we endoge-
nize reelection probabilities but treat retirement decisions as exogenous. We view
our approach as complementary to a career decision model, as we seek to examine
the extent to which endogenous voter decisions can explain reelection probabilities,
but we do not model endogenous retirement decisions.
3 The Model
We model voters in each senatorial seat as identical dynamically optimizing agents
who value services from an elected oﬃcial, in our case a senator. The valuation
has two components: a senator-speciﬁc, permanent quality q and a tenure eﬀect τm
common to all senators of tenure m.8 The quality q is an element of a compact set
Q. Tenure is deﬁned by the number of completed terms in oﬃce. Both q and m are
observed by the voters. The utility ﬂow for the voter in a given period is additive
in these two components, i.e.,
u(q,m) = q + τm. (1)
The voter values the expected sum of current and future utility ﬂows, discounted
by β < 1.
In each period, voters choose between two candidates in an election. There are
two kinds of elections between which it is useful to distinguish. One is an incumbent-
challenger election. This is an election where an incumbent runs against a challenger.
The other type is called an open seat election, which takes place in situations where
neither candidate is an incumbent. This happens when incumbents leave oﬃce for
reasons other than losing an election. We assume that these reasons are exogenous
and depend only on tenure.
The timing is as follows. At the beginning of the period, the incumbent either
exits or runs for reelection. Denote the probability of exit at tenure m by δm. If he
8 Our notation includes τ0, which is to be interpreted as the tenure eﬀect of candidates with
zero tenure. We argue below that this parameter is not empirically separately identiﬁed from the
mean of the candidate’s quality distribution. We include it here to simplify the formal description
of the dynamic program.
7exits, two new candidates run for the seat. If he runs for reelection, a single chal-
lenger runs against the incumbent. Each new candidate then draws his permanent
quality q from an atomless distribution F(q) with corresponding density f(q).9 In
the estimation, we allow F to diﬀer depending on the type of election, to account
for possible diﬀerences in the quality distribution of candidates running in open seat
elections vs. challengers running against incumbents. For simplicity of notation we
abstract from this in the description of the model.
The tenure eﬀects τm are tenure-speciﬁc constants known to the voter. The
voter observes the qualities of the current candidates and then elects the candidate
that maximizes expected discounted utility. The voter also knows the distribution
F from which future candidates will draw their permanent qualities.
For an open seat election, the optimal choice of the voter is simple: choose
the candidate with the higher q. The utility ﬂows generated by the candidates are
otherwise identical.
In an incumbent-challenger election the decision is more complicated. We express
the problem recursively using a Bellman equation. Denote by q the quality of the
incumbent and by qc the quality of the challenger. The voter’s decision can be
expressed as a function of the incumbent senator’s quality q and tenure m. Let
V (q,m) denote the expected discounted utility for the voter at the beginning of
the period, before either exit occurs or new candidates appear. Let W denote the
expected discounted utility from an open seat. Then,







q + τm + βV (q,m + 1),




f(qc)dqc + δmW. (2)
If the incumbent chooses to run again (which occurs with probability 1 − δm), the
voter chooses between the incumbent and a challenger. The integral in the ﬁrst
term in (2) reﬂects the expected utility in this case, which involves integrating over
qc.
If the incumbent exits, creating an open seat election, the voter obtains W.
9 We assume that F is atomless to ensure that the voter has strict preferences over candidates
with probability one.










q + τ0 + βV (q,1),





The value of the open seat reﬂects the fact that two candidates are drawn and the
higher q is retained.
Denote by r(q,qc,m) the optimal reelection rule of a voter when the incumbent
has quality q and tenure m and the challenger has quality qc; r(q,qc,m) = 1 de-
notes reelecting the incumbent and r(q,qc,m) = 0 denotes choosing the challenger.
We now show that the solution to the decision problem can be characterized as a
cutoﬀ rule. As a result, the Bellman equation takes a simple form that is useful in
computing the solution. We start by characterizing the decision rule.
Lemma 1 r(q,qc,m) is weakly decreasing in qc.
The proof is in Appendix A.1. The lemma implies that the voter follows a cutoﬀ
rule: challengers are elected only if their quality exceeds a cutoﬀ ¯ q(q,m). Note that
voters do not simply choose the candidate with the higher q, or even the higher
q + τm, since the voter is forward-looking and considers future tenure eﬀects and
exit probabilities.
The cutoﬀ rule allows us to express the Bellman equation more concisely. We do
this by deﬁning V (q,0) to be the voter’s value function from an open seat election
where one candidate has drawn q and a second candidate’s quality has yet to be
drawn. Then, by letting δ0 = 0, equation (2) can be rewritten as
V (q,m) =(1 − δm)max
¯ q

 F(¯ q)(q + τm + βV (q,m + 1))
+
R ∞







If the incumbent does not exit (the case given in (4a)), the expected return has two
components: ﬁrst, the payoﬀ when the incumbent is retained, times the probability
of retention F(¯ q); second, the expected value of the challenger, conditional on his
9quality being above ¯ q. When the incumbent exits, the ﬂow utility enjoyed by the
voter δmW in (2) can be rewritten as (4b) by using (4) and δ0 = 0 to deﬁne V (x,0).
4 Estimation
4.1 Overview
Our goal is to provide inference on the fundamental parameters of our model: the
candidate permanent quality density f, the tenure eﬀects τm, the exit probabilities
δm, and the discount factor β. Our data contain information on when and how each
U.S. senator came to oﬃce and when and how he left oﬃce. These data allow us
to understand, for instance, whether a senator came to oﬃce by winning an open
election or by defeating an incumbent.
We do not directly observe any component of quality. However, given a vector
of fundamental parameters, the model generates a probability distribution over se-
quences of electoral outcomes. We use the method of maximum likelihood to ﬁnd
the parameter values that maximize the probability of seeing the observed electoral
outcomes.
To understand how the model provides evidence on reelection probabilities that
we observe in the data, it is useful to consider a special case. Suppose that tenure
eﬀects and exit probabilities are constant across tenure, i.e. τm = ¯ τ and δm = ¯ δ.
In this case, the policy function satisﬁes ¯ q(q,m) = q; the voter always chooses the
candidate with the higher q because tenure does not aﬀect current or future payoﬀs.
Suppose that candidate A won an open seat election in 1960 against candidate
B and then defeated challenger C in 1966. After that election, we know that A’s
permanent quality q is distributed as the maximum of 3 i.i.d. draws from F. Suppose
instead that C had won in 1966. Then, we can infer instead that C’s permanent
quality is distributed as the maximum of 3 i.i.d. draws from F. Thus, the probability
of the incumbent winning in 1972 depends solely on the number of elections that
have occurred since the last open election for that seat. As a result, the probability
of reelection will be increasing in the number of terms since an open seat, and
10conditionally independent of tenure.
In general, the probability of reelection will depend on the entire history of wins
and losses since an open seat election. Let us extend the electoral history of the
previous paragraph to consider the 1972 election, and suppose that the challenger,
D, wins in 1972. In the case where τ1 = τ2 = ¯ τ, our posterior on the permanent
quality of D is independent of whether he beat A or C. However, consider the case
where tenure eﬀects depend on tenure, for example τ1 < τ2. For simplicity, assume
that β = 0. If D defeated the two-term incumbent A in 1972, then D must have had
a suﬃciently high q to overcome his deﬁcit in tenure eﬀects τ2 −τ1. In contrast, we
cannot make the same inference if D defeated the one-term incumbent C in 1972.
Thus, our posterior density of the permanent quality of D is higher if he beat A
than if he beat C.
Extending this example to 1978, D’s probability of being reelected depends not
only on his tenure (1 term) and the number of terms since an open seat election (3
terms), but also on whether he beat A or C. This example demonstrates why the
entire history matters.
The example also suggests how our model can separately identify tenure eﬀects
from selection eﬀects. Conditional on a candidate’s tenure, the model will, for
diﬀerent parameter values, predict diﬀerent probabilities of reelection given diﬀerent
histories since the last open seat election. By matching these predictions of the
model to the data, we can understand the relative importance of selection and
tenure eﬀects.
This discussion also illustrates the diﬃculty of using regressions to separate
tenure eﬀects from selection eﬀects, as previous studies have attempted to do. To
be consistent with the model, one cannot simply regress the probability of reelection
on candidate tenure and simple statistics such as terms since an open seat or number
of senators since an open seat. The regressors would instead have to include the
entire history since the open seat election, which would imply thousands of regressors
for our data set.
We now turn to the speciﬁcs of our data and our inference procedure.
114.2 Data and Institutional Background
We construct our data set using data on U.S. Senate elections from the Roster of
U.S. Congressional Oﬃce Holders (ICPSR 7803). In the original data set each
record refers to a senator seated in a given congress (a two-year period starting in
odd-numbered years) and contains information about when and why the senator was
seated and when and why he left congress. The ICPSR data set ends in 1998. We
compiled more recent data in order to extend this data set up to the 2002 election.10
We use these data to construct records of histories from an open seat election
to an exit. We refer to one such history as a chain. Each chain is a vector of zeros
and ones, with dimension equal to the number of elections held between the open
seat election and the exit of the last senator in the chain. We do not include the
outcomes of open seat elections in the chain. The ﬁrst element of the vector is equal
to one if the winner of the open seat election wins his next election; that element
is equal to zero if the challenger wins. The second element is equal to one if the
winner of the second election wins the third election, and it is equal to zero if his
challenger wins, etc.
The normal term of a senator is six years. Regular elections are held in November
of even-numbered years, and senators take oﬃce in the January following their
election. Each Senate seat belongs to one of three classes, based on the the year in
which its regular elections are held.
Senators can leave oﬃce at the end of their terms essentially for three reasons,
losing a general election, losing a primary election or retiring. Our data contain
instances where senators leave oﬃce before the end of a six-year term because of
death, retirement, or moving to a diﬀerent oﬃce or job. In this case, an election
is held on or before the next even-numbered November. The election is called a
special election unless that senatorial seat was scheduled to have an election at that
time. The governor of the state often appoints an individual to serve as senator
until someone is elected.
10 To gather the most recent data, we collected and compared information from var-
ious sources, including the Biographical Directory of the United States Congress (see
http://bioguide.congress.gov).
12Every chain starts with an open seat. Open seat elections consist of all elections
following the exit of a candidate because of death or retirement.11 As a consequence,
we treat all special elections as open seat elections even if one of the candidates
brieﬂy served as an unelected senator nominated by the governor. Our deﬁnition
of an open seat election also implies that an election where the incumbent senator
lost in the primary is not an open seat election. We treat the primary and general
elections as a single election with two candidates.
We treat all elections, whether special or regular, as counting for one term.
This simpliﬁcation is imperfect because the time period in our model is one term,
and so the voter is assumed to discount the future identically if there are four
years between elections (due to a special election) or if there are six years between
elections. Moreover, the interpretation of the tenure eﬀects is that they depend on
number of elections won rather than number of years served.
Senators have been elected by popular vote only since 1914, as initiated by U.S.
Constitutional Amendment XVII. Before this change, senators were appointed by
the state legislature. As we do not have a model of how the state legislature chose
senators, we only consider data from elections held on or after 1914. Moreover, it is
conceptually diﬃcult to use chains that started before 1914 because we do not have
a model for the density of permanent quality for an incumbent senator after 1914
unless every senator in his chain was elected and not appointed. Thus, our data set
contains only chains that start on or after 1914.
The use of these Senate data avoids several pitfalls present in other data sources.
In particular, the U.S. House of Representatives contains many instances of redis-
tricting and it is not clear how to treat elections following a redistricting, when two
incumbents may run against each other.
Our data set contains 389 chains, with 593 diﬀerent senators and 1330 elections.
We observe an exit preceding each of these 389 chains. Out of the 389 exits, 72
required a special election to choose the next senator. Considering all elections
besides open seat elections, the incumbent senator won 737 out of 941 times (78%).
11 We observe cases where a senator loses an election and then retires between the election and
the end of his term. We ignore the retirement decision in these cases.
13Of the 204 incumbent losses, 43 occurred during the primary, with the rest occurring
during the general election.
Among the chains, 81 have dimension zero, which occurs when the winner of the
open seat election exits without running for reelection. The chains contain at most
7 diﬀerent senators and at most 15 elections. The longest tenure for a senator was
Senator Strom Thurmond, who served from 1954 to 2002, winning 8 elections. Only
23 senators served more than 5 terms. To avoid estimating parameters with very
few observations, we assume that τm = τ5 and δm = δ5 for all m ≥ 5.
4.3 Inference and Likelihood
As is well-known in the literature, it is diﬃcult to estimate the discount factor
of a dynamic discrete choice problem (see Rust (1987) and Magnac and Thesmar
(2002)). We consider 4% to be a reasonable discount rate on an annual basis.
Given that a regular term lasts six years, we set β equal to 0.96 to the power of
six. In principle, we could jointly estimate all of the other parameters. However,
since we treat the retirement probability as exogenous, we can obtain consistent
estimates of the retirement probabilities δm without solving the voter’s decision
problem. Speciﬁcally, we estimate δm as the number of senators who retire with
tenure m divided by the total number of senators that held oﬃce for at least m
terms.
We allow the quality distribution of new candidates to vary depending on the
type of elections. Speciﬁcally, we assume that candidates in an open seat election
draw permanent quality q from a distribution Fo, whereas challengers of incumbents
draw their permanent quality from a distribution Fc. We assume that both distri-
butions are normal with means µo and µc and variances σo and σc, respectively.12
Note that µo and µc are not separately identiﬁed given our data: a shift in both
means would not change any observable prediction of the model. Thus, we normal-
12 Note that the support of the normal density is not compact, which is inconsistent with the
assumption, made in Section 3, that the densities are drawn from a compact set Q. We made this
assumption solely to facilitate the proof of Lemma 1. This proof can be extended to the normal
density by considering truncations of the density to an interval [−a,a], and letting a go to inﬁnity.
An example of this approach is contained in Mitchell (2000).
14ize µc = 0 and estimate µo. Similarly, we cannot separately identify σo from σc,
because multiplying both standard deviations by the same factor has the same eﬀect
of changing the unit of measurement of the candidates’ quality. Thus, we normalize
σc = 1. Although σo is then identiﬁed from the data, we also normalize σo = 1 in
the interest of parsimony.13 Finally, adding a constant to τ0 and the same constant
to τ1,...τ5 would yield the same predictions. Therefore, we set τ0 = 0.
We now discuss the estimation of the parameters. Consider ﬁrst the contribution
to the likelihood of chain d of dimension T. Denote the history of wins and losses
prior to the tth election in the chain with the vector ht ≡ hd1,...dt−1i.14 Denote the
posterior density over incumbent quality after history ht as g(·|ht), and the number
of terms served by the incumbent holding oﬃce after history ht as mht. Deﬁne et
as the random variable that indicates the outcome of the tth election in the chain,
with the interpretation that et = 1 indicates the incumbent winning the election













dt · Fc (¯ q(x,mht))





The expression (5) depends on the policy function ¯ q, which in turn depends on
the parameters. The expression also depends on the density of permanent quality
for the incumbent at the start of period t, g(x|ht). We evaluate this density using
Bayes’ Law and the policy function ¯ q. Let the prior density of the incumbent at
time t (by the econometrician) be denoted p and decompose history ht into two
elements: the outcome of last period election dt−1 and the previous history ht−1.
13 We estimate a speciﬁcation where we constrain fo = fc. For this speciﬁcation, we set µ = 0
and σ = 1, as these parameters are not identiﬁed.
14 Recall from our deﬁnition of a chain that the ﬁrst element, d1, is the outcome of the incumbent-
challenger election following the initial open seat election. Hence this vector does not contain the
outcome of the open seat election, which has no informational content for our purposes.
15Bayes’ Law implies











Unconditional probability of outcome dt−1
. (6)
The prior density p is equal to fo if the incumbent won an open seat election in the
previous period, and fc if the incumbent won against a previous incumbent. In all
other cases, p is deﬁned recursively as equal to g(·|ht−1).
We now show how this formula is applied to the diﬀerent cases. First, consider
the density of a one-term incumbent who won an open seat election in the previous
period. In this case the prior density is fo, and the conditional probability of winning
the open seat given q is Fo (¯ q(q,0)). For this case, (6) can be written as:
g (q|h0) =
fo (q) · Fo (¯ q(q,0)) R
Q fo (x) · Fo (¯ q(x,0))dx
. (7)
Next, consider the cases with t > 1. We distinguish two cases, depending on whether
the incumbent won or lost in the previous election. If dt−1 = 1, then the conditional
probability of the election outcome in the previous period is equal to the proba-
bility that the challenger draws a permanent quality less than the threshold value
¯ q(q,mht−1), hence:
g (q|ht) =









· Fc (¯ q(x,mht−1))dx
. (8)
Finally, if dt−1 = 0, the incumbent was a challenger at t−1. This means that the
prior density is f and that his permanent quality q is greater than the threshold ¯ q(·)
implied by the voters’ decision rule, which is a function of the previous incumbent’s
quality and history. Since the previous incumbent quality is distributed according












16In order to evaluate the log likelihood of our data set for a given parameter
vector, we ﬁrst compute the policy function using numerical dynamic programming.
We then evaluate the likelihood for a chain using the computed policy function,
together with (5) and (6), and sum the log of the likelihood for each chain. Details
on the numerical procedure used in the estimation are in Appendix A.2.
5 Results
We ﬁrst examine simple data on reelection probabilities, in order to understand
what the data imply about the possible values of the parameters. We then turn to
the structural estimation results. Last, we perform a variety of robustness checks,
to ensure the accuracy of our base structural estimation results.
5.1 Evidence from Data
Our model implies that the history of a seat since an open seat election will aﬀect
the probability of reelection. We encapsulate the history of a seat at any election
with two simple statistics: the number of terms since an open seat election and
the number of terms that the incumbent had previously served. Table 1 provides a
grid that breaks down the probability of an incumbent winning based on these two
factors.15
We ﬁrst consider the diagonal of this table to understand what it implies about
tenure eﬀects. The diagonal provides the reelection probabilities for candidates who
are initially elected to the Senate by winning an open seat election. The ﬁrst element
shows that winners of open seat elections who do not exit during their ﬁrst term in
oﬃce win 79% of the time in their next election. The second element shows that open
seat winners who survive reelection and who do not exit during their ﬁrst two terms
in oﬃce have a conditional reelection probability of 78%. The conditional reelection
probabilities with three or more terms are very similar to these two numbers.
15 We exclude open seat elections from this table, as they provide no information in the context
of our model.


















































Table 1: Winning frequencies (standard deviations in parentheses) and number of
observations N by tenure and terms since last open seat election.
We argue that the data from the diagonal show that tenure eﬀects are declining,
provided that there are no dynamic considerations and the candidate densities are
the same for the two types of elections.16 For a contradiction, assume that the tenure
eﬀects are zero, i.e., τm = 0 ∀m, and Fo = Fc. With no dynamic considerations,
identical candidate densities and zero tenure eﬀects, in each election voters choose
the candidate with the highest permanent quality. Therefore, the distribution of
quality of an incumbent who initially won an open seat election and who served n
terms is simply max{Fo,1,...,Fo,n+1}. Thus, the expected quality is higher the more
terms the incumbent has served, and the reelection probabilities should be increasing
in the number of terms served, which we do not see in the data. If the tenure eﬀects
are increasing, rather than zero, this eﬀect will be further exacerbated, showing that
16 There will be no dynamic considerations if either β = 0 or δm is constant across m. While we
cannot construct a proof of our argument if there are dynamic considerations or if the two candidate
densities are diﬀerent, it is still likely to be true.
18the tenure eﬀects must be negative to explain this feature of the data.17
Next, we argue that tenure eﬀects are negative. Since the eﬀects are declining, it
is suﬃcient to argue that τ1 ≤ 0. One might hypothesize that τ1 > 0 is necessary to
explain why the reelection probabilities from the diagonal are all signiﬁcantly higher
than 50%. However, there are two facets of the data that make this hypothesis
unlikely.
First, in the absence of tenure eﬀects, diﬀerent densities, or dynamic considera-
tions, selection alone implies that the incumbent will have a 67% chance of winning
reelection,18 a number reasonably close to the actual probability, and one that will
be higher if candidates in an open seat election are of higher quality. Of course,
this explanation is not nonparametric in that it might be driven by the density of
candidate quality, which is assumed to be normal. Nonetheless, the point is that
selection by itself will imply high reelection probabilities for incumbents.
Second, we obtain further evidence against positive tenure eﬀects by examining
the change in reelection probabilities along the ﬁrst row of Table 1. If, in fact,
τ1 is positive, then we would expect that a senator who defeated an incumbent
senator with one term of experience would, on average, have very high quality, as
the electorate would have to endure a new senator instead of a senator with τ1 for one
period. When this incumbent-defeating senator gets to his ﬁrst reelection campaign,
he should then have a very high chance of reelection: not only is his expected quality
very high by selection, but now the tenure eﬀects work to his favor. This logic can
be generalized to argue that reelection probabilities should be rapidly increasing
along any given row of Table 1 if the tenure eﬀects are positive. Yet, there is no
pattern of rapid increase in the probability of reelection along any row. Indeed, for
the above case (which has the most observations), the incumbent-defeating senators
win reelection only 72% of the time, as compared to the 79% reelection probability
for one-term incumbents who won an open seat election. The implication is that
17 Note that a conventional “sophomore surge” analysis could not generate this result, as it
either would not use any data beyond the (1,1) cell or would lump all of these elements together.
18 We derive this ﬁgure by simulating the probability that the maximum of two draws from a
normal density (the incumbent quality) is greater than a third draw (the challenger quality), since
the decision rule in this case is simply to keep the higher quality candidate.
19the selection was not all that favorable, and hence that τ1 was not actually positive.
Finally, the decrease in reelection probabilities noted above also suggests that
the open seat density is diﬀerent from the incumbent-challenger density. The reason
for this is that no matter what the tenure eﬀects are, we would not expect to see
decreasing reelection probabilities in any row, if the two densities are the same.
The reason for this is that any diﬀerence in reelection probabilities between the
candidates in a given row is due to selection, not tenure eﬀects, since their tenures
are the same. Moreover, the further down the row a candidate is, the more times
he has been selected. This makes it very diﬃcult to have selection generate the
decreasing reelection rate when all candidates are drawn from the same density,
regardless of the tenure eﬀects.19
In contrast, diﬀerent densities for candidates in open seat elections and chal-
lengers of incumbents can easily explain this decrease. In particular, if µo > 0 then
a challenger facing an incumbent starts from a lower quality density than the in-
cumbent, and hence may, on average, have lower quality upon winning than the
incumbent had upon winning his ﬁrst election. We veriﬁed this hypothesis by sim-
ulating voter decisions with no tenure eﬀects or dynamic considerations but with
positive µo.20 Choosing µo = 1.0 as an example, the winner of an open seat elec-
tion would have a mean quality of 1.57 while a senator who defeated a one-term
incumbent who won an open seat election would have a mean quality of only 1.34,
indicating a lower reelection probability in the second case. Thus, a positive µo can
explain the decrease in reelection probabilities between the ﬁrst two elements of the
ﬁrst row of Table 1.
In summary, the statistics of the data reported in Table 1 suggest that tenure
eﬀects τm are negative for m ≥ 1, and that the density of candidates is higher for
open seat elections than for incumbent-challenger elections. It is important to note
that the above discussion considered the eﬀects of selection, tenure, and candidate
19 While we cannot oﬀer a formal nonparametric proof of this result, we were unable to ﬁnd
parameters for our model that resulted in decreasing probabilities of reelection along a row, when
the two densities were the same.
20 Note that the decision rule in this case is still to keep the higher quality candidate.
20N. obs. Estimate
δ1 593 0.1484 (0.015)
δ2 358 0.2347 (0.022)
δ3 199 0.2915 (0.032)
δ4 100 0.3300 (0.047)
δ5 90 0.3500 (0.050)
Table 2: Conditional exit probabilities by tenure (standard errors in parentheses)
density in isolation. We cannot consider all of these eﬀects together using simple
statistics. Moreover, with β > 0, decisions will vary in complicated ways based
on the retirement probabilities. In order to precisely quantify the sources of the
incumbency advantage, we turn to our structural model.
5.2 Base Structural Estimation Results
Table 2 shows the conditional exit probabilities used in the estimation of the other
parameters. The reported values are the mean probabilities from the data, with the
standard errors then computed by using the number of observations. Not surpris-
ingly, these are precisely estimated and increasing in tenure.
Table 3 shows the main structural estimation results, with bootstrapped stan-
dard errors in parentheses. Model 1 refers to the case where all candidates are drawn
from the same distribution; in Model 2, we allow for the possibility that open seat
candidates draw from a distribution with a mean diﬀerent from candidates challeng-
ing incumbents. Our principal results are those from Model 2. The units can be
understood by noting that the standard deviation on the distribution of quality is
one.
In Model 2, we ﬁnd a negative and statistically signiﬁcant tenure eﬀect. The
eﬀect is small: for the most common cases — incumbents of one, two, or three years
of tenure — the tenure eﬀects are estimated to be less than two-thirds of one stan-





ln L −504.851 −486.751
τ1 -0.013 (0.281) -0.646 (0.200)
τ2 0.116 (0.195) -0.657 (0.211)
τ3 0.181 (0.251) -0.615 (0.259)
τ4 -0.754 (0.581) -1.495 (0.543)
τ5 0.241 (0.516) 0.738 (0.523)
µo − µc 0 0.742 (0.093)
Table 3: Estimated parameters (standard errors in parentheses)
an open seat election are superior to challengers who run against incumbents; as a
way to evaluate the magnitude, consider that the average candidate in an open seat
election would be in the 75th percentile of the quality distribution for challengers
to an incumbent. Moreover, the diﬀerence µo −µc is precisely estimated. Thus, the
results show that any advantage to incumbency is not inherent to the oﬃce, but
rather the result of weaker candidates running as challengers against incumbents.
The signiﬁcance of µo − µc implies that Model 1, which assumes that there is no
diﬀerence in challenger quality across the two elections, cannot ﬁt the data as well
as Model 2. This is substantiated by the likelihood ratio test based on the log like-
lihoods reported in Table 3, which vastly rejects Model 1 (χ2(1) = 36.2,p = .00).
We prefer Model 2 for these reasons. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that Model 1
gives similar predictions in the sense that the tenure eﬀects are estimated to be very
small or negative.
As the estimates reveal that the direct eﬀect of tenure is negative, the incum-
bency advantage is due to a combination of selection and incumbents facing weaker
challengers. We now ask how big is the incumbent’s beneﬁt from facing weaker
challengers, by simulating the equilibrium predictions of the model with diﬀerent






1 (N = 474) .755 (.020) -0.029 -0.003
2 (N = 249) .799 (.025) +0.001 +0.006
3 (N = 122) .820 (.035) -0.010 +0.002
4 (N = 58) .793 (.053) -0.042 -0.036
≥ 5 (N = 38) .895 (.050) +0.021 +0.009
All (N = 941) .783 (0.013) -0.008 +0.007
Table 4: Goodness of ﬁt: reelection frequencies by tenure; data (standard deviations
in parentheses), and diﬀerence between models’ predictions and data
ilar to the estimated value of 79% for Model 2. However, if incumbents were faced
with challengers with the same distribution of quality as in an open seat election,
then the model predicts that they would win only 63% of the time. If there were no
quality diﬀerences across candidates whatsoever, then an incumbent would always
have a 50% probability of reelection. In this sense, roughly half of the incumbency
advantage is due to lower quality challengers.
A useful measure of goodness of ﬁt is the ability of the models to reproduce
reelection probabilities. Table 4 provides the reelection probabilities as a function
of tenure.
Model 2 is able to ﬁt the reelection percentages by tenure very accurately, par-
ticularly for the ﬁrst three rows, which contain the bulk of the data. It would be
troubling to argue that tenure eﬀects are small if the model underpredicts reelec-
tion probabilities and hence does not generate suﬃcient incumbency advantage in
winning probabilities. Model 2, however, accurately predicts winning probabilities
with negative tenure eﬀects. Thus, the model is not throwing out tenure eﬀects at
the expense of generating a high winning percentage for incumbents; it generates
them all through the selection eﬀect and the diﬀerent densities for incumbents and


















































Table 5: Goodness of ﬁt: Models 1 and 2 predicted reelection frequencies by tenure
and terms since open seat (diﬀerence between predictions of models and data in
parentheses)
challengers. Model 1 does less well at ﬁtting these moments, demonstrating the
importance of allowing for diﬀerent densities.
Note also that the inference that tenure eﬀects are negative or small is robust
to the assumption of exogenous retirement. If senators were retiring because they
were expecting a loss, then the senators who choose to run for reelection would have
better selection than the unconditional average. This positive selection would then
be reﬂected in the tenure eﬀects, implying that our tenure eﬀects would be upwardly
biased.
We further evaluate the goodness of ﬁt of the estimated models by examining
how well they match the conditional probabilities of reelection by terms served and
terms since an open seat election given in Table 1. As noted in Section 5.1, these
moments summarize much of the important identiﬁcation of the model. Table 5
provides these probabilities for our two models, as well as indicating the diﬀerence
between the data and the predictions of the models.
Model 2 is generally successful at matching these moments of the data. In all
but six cells, the predictions from Model 2 are within one standard deviation of
24the reelection probabilities from the data. In all but one cell, the predictions from
Model 2 are within two standard deviations of the percentages from the data.
In contrast, Model 1 does much less well at matching these moments. In partic-
ular, Model 1 underpredicts by 13 percentage points the reelection probability for
the case with the most observations, of an incumbent who won an open seat election
seeking his ﬁrst reelection (row 1, column 1), but overpredicts by 4 percentage points
the reelection probability of a one-term incumbent who obtained oﬃce by defeating
an open seat winner who had served one term (row 1, column 2). The reason for
this relates to the discussion in Section 5.1: the incumbents in these two cells have
identical tenure eﬀects, but the column 2 cell has a better selection. Thus, with the
same candidate density for challengers in the open-seat and incumbent-challenger
elections, Model 1 has a very hard time explaining the drop in the probability of
reelection between these two cells.
In comparison to our models, conventional “sophomore surge” analysis either
looks only at the case where the number of terms since the last open seat election is
one, or lumps together all one-term incumbents. By examining the reelection prob-
ability for candidates as a function of the entire history since an open seat election,
our models generate results that are robust to diﬀerent tenure eﬀects and are sub-
stantiated in the data. Consistent with our results, the Levitt and Wolfram (1997)
study of House incumbency advantage ﬁnds that a large fraction of the incumbency
advantage is the result of the ability of incumbents to deter high quality challengers
from running against them. However, they also ﬁnd evidence of substantial tenure
eﬀects, which we do not ﬁnd. Whether this discrepancy is the result of diﬀerent
modeling assumptions, or evidence of diﬀerent causes of incumbency advantage be-
tween the House and the Senate is an interesting topic for further research.
5.3 Robustness to additional sources of heterogeneity
In the analysis so far, candidates may be diﬀerent because of diﬀerent idiosyncratic
draws from the quality distribution. The only source of heterogeneity in the candi-
date quality distribution arises from whether they run against an incumbent or in
25an open seat election. We have been parsimonious in specifying sources of hetero-
geneity because we wanted to focus on the eﬀects of selection on the incumbency
advantage and because predicted moments from the structural estimation, based on
reelection probabilities by candidate tenure and history, ﬁt the data reasonably well.
As a robustness check, this section investigates whether the inclusion of addi-
tional candidate characteristics could potentially lead to diﬀerent results.
Previous experience in the U.S. House of Representatives
Several candidates become senators as part of a career path that starts in state
legislatures, and continues in the U.S. House of Representatives. We investigated
whether previous experience in the House signiﬁcantly aﬀects the probability of a
senator winning reelection. We found that among senators that just won an open
seat, those with House experience win reelection 81% of the time, whereas those
without House experience win reelection 78% of the time.21 The similarity between
these reelection probabilities suggests that including experience as an additional
source of heterogeneity to the estimation would probably not add much explanatory
power.
Party membership
In the political science literature, party membership is suggested to be a possible
source of incumbency advantage. Presidential coat-tail eﬀects, for example, could
aﬀect senators’ winning probabilities. On a conceptual level, the main diﬃculty with
including party as an exogenous characteristic aﬀecting quality is that voter opinion
swings over time, and the eﬀect of party membership may therefore vary over time.
One possibility is that in some states at some points in time, voters have special
preferences for candidates from one party. In the context of a dynamic model, one
could model these preferences by allowing for the party of the senator who exited
at the end of the previous chain to aﬀect the utility ﬂow from a candidate of that
party in the current chain. We could then estimate the amount of extra utility from
having a candidate of the same party, and would generally expect it to be positive.
21 This is consistent with results from Diermeier et al. (2002).
26ln L = −483.698 Type 1 Type 2
τ1 8.00 (11.95) -0.86 (0.21)
τ2 3.44 (12.10) -0.68 (0.34)
τ3 8.00 (21.92) -0.83 (0.39)
τ4 8.00 (15.12) -1.84 (0.51)
τ5 3.62 ( 8.16) -0.83 (0.50)
µo − µc -3.55 (6.73) 0.901 (0.23)
Type prob. 0.091 (0.10)
Table 6: Estimates for model with unobserved heterogeneity
Yet, in our data, candidates from the same party of the previous incumbent win
only 39% of the open seat elections. With a positive local preference for one party,
we would expect this ﬁgure to be greater than 50%. Thus, this suggests that there
is no special preference for a party within states.
Unobserved heterogeneity
Despite the basic evidence we presented above, experience, party membership,
and other factors may aﬀect winning probabilities. The main problem is that our
basic speciﬁcations do not account for the possibility that some states have huge,
positive tenure eﬀects (“safe” states where, for instance, a candidate of the prevailing
political party has an inherent advantage), while others have moderately negative
tenure eﬀects.
In order to understand whether other sources of heterogeneity may aﬀect our
results, we tested the presence of unobserved heterogeneity by assuming that there
are two types of chains, characterized by diﬀerent values of the tenure eﬀects τ1−τ5,
and the open seat candidates’ advantage µo − µc. We estimated the two sets of
parameters (one per type), together with the type probability.22 The results are
22 The dynamic optimization problem is solved for each type, providing a likelihood function
conditional on type. The total likelihood is a mixture over types weighted by sample probabilities,
which are estimated together with the type-speciﬁc parameters (see, e.g., Eckstein and Wolpin
(1990), or Keane and Wolpin (1997)).
27ln L = −479.023 Type 1 Type 2
τ1 5.86 (5.02) -0.90 (0.21)
τ2 1.09 (27.02) -0.67 (0.29)
τ3 7.99 (51.69) -0.89 (0.37)
τ4 4.54 (3.82) -1.88 (0.45)
τ5 1.76 (4.95) -0.86 (0.42)
µo − µc -3.40 (3.19) 0.95 (0.20)
Type Probabilities
After 1945, South 0.024 (0.08)
After 1945, not South 0 (0.06)
Before 1945, South 0.166 (0.15)
Before 1945, not South 0.281 (0.14)
Table 7: Estimates, unobserved heterogeneity with type probability function of
observables
reported in Table 6, with derivative-based standard errors reported in parentheses.23
We estimate two distinct type of chains. With probability 9.1%, a chain will be
of Type 1 and have large and positive tenure eﬀects, while with the complementary
probability it will have negative and signiﬁcant tenure eﬀect. These results suggest
that incumbency advantage is big in some chains (candidates almost never lose in
chains of Type 1). The ﬁt of the data, however, does not signiﬁcantly improve
from the Model 2 speciﬁcation.24 Moreover, a likelihood ratio test cannot reject the
one-type speciﬁcation.25
We also investigated similar speciﬁcations, but with the type probabilities as
a function of the region and date the chains began. We computed several such
speciﬁcations, but report only one of them in Table 7 in the interest of parsimony.
23 We chose not to bootstrap the standard errors in these cases because of computational
constraints.
24 Details are available from the authors upon request.
25 Note that we are testing a boundary condition using a two-sided test. The results from the
test are therefore only indicative.
28None of these speciﬁcations substantially improve the ﬁt of the data. According to
likelihood ratio tests, none of them signiﬁcantly improves on the basic speciﬁcation
without unobserved heterogeneity.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
We analyze the causes of incumbency advantage for the U.S. Senate by structurally
estimating a dynamic optimizing model of voter behavior. Our results are identiﬁed
by examining the impact of the entire history of election outcomes following an
open election on the probability that an incumbent will win, conditioning on the
tenure of the incumbent. We ﬁnd that the incumbency advantage is due to two
eﬀects. Incumbent senators are, on average, selected to be of high quality due to
their past successes in winning elections. In addition, incumbent senators are able
to deter high quality challengers. We ﬁnd no evidence of other beneﬁts intrinsic to
incumbency: tenure appears to provide a small disadvantage in reelection.
Our result that tenure is not an important determinant of the incumbency ad-
vantage stands in contrast to some of the literature. However, studies of incumbency
advantage have mostly focused on the U.S. House of Representatives. Relative to the
House, tenure in the Senate may be less important, because committee assignments
are not as important.
Our result that incumbents face weaker challengers does have precedent in the
literature. For instance, Levitt and Wolfram (1997) ﬁnd the same eﬀect in House
elections, although with a diﬀerent identiﬁcation mechanism. Note that the selection
eﬀect still implies that incumbent senators are hard to defeat, and therefore our ﬁnd-
ing that potential challengers might be dissuaded from running against incumbents
is not puzzling.
There is substantial information available about elections besides the history of
a seat that might be relevant that are not in our base model. The results presented
in Section 5.3, in particular our estimates from the speciﬁcations with unobserved
heterogeneity, suggest that our basic conclusions should not be aﬀected by the in-
clusion of additional information about candidates. However, inclusion of additional
29variables can potentially disentangle the magnitudes of diﬀerent sources of tenure
eﬀects. We believe this is an interesting direction for future research.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Denote by M the ﬁnite set of allowable tenures for an incumbent. We prove
the lemma by ﬁrst showing that V (q,m) is increasing in the ﬁrst argument, using
standard recursive techniques (see Stokey et al. (1989)). Denote by C the metric
space of all continuous functions g : Q × M → R that are weakly increasing in
the ﬁrst argument, where the metric is deﬁned by the sup norm. Note that C is
a complete metric space since these countinuous functions, on a compact domain,
must be bounded. Deﬁne the mapping T for any function g ∈ C by






(q + τm + βg(q,m + 1)),
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Notice that, whenever g is weakly increasing and continuous, so is T(g), so T
is an operator, T : C → C. Notice that T meets Blackwell’s suﬃcient conditions
for a contraction: for any function g0 ≥ g, T(g0) ≥ T(g), and for a constant c,
T(g + c) = T(g) + βc, 0 < β < 1. Hence, by the contraction mapping lemma, for
all functions V0 ∈ C, the sequence deﬁned by Vn = G(Vn−1) converges to a function
V ∈ C that is the unique ﬁxed point of the operator T. Since V is the ﬁxed point, it
is exactly the value function that solves the dynamic programming problem. Since
V ∈ C, the value function V is weakly increasing in the ﬁrst argument.
Note that qc only shows up in two places in the choice of candidates (once in
the current reward from choosing the challenger, once in the future value if the
challenger is chosen), and if V is weakly increasing in the ﬁrst argument, the total
discounted reward from choosing the challenger is strictly increasing in qc, while
30the discounted reward from choosing the incumbent is constant in qc. As a result,
r(q,qc,m) must be decreasing in qc for any ﬁxed q and m.
A.2 Details on the numerical computation
The permanent quality distribution F is continuous, which implies that we need
to approximate the value function in our computation. We choose a discrete grid
approximation, and use 401 evenly spaced grid points between −6 and +6, in order
to capture the tails of the standard normal density (351 grid points and −8/ + 8,
respectively, in the unobserved heterogeneity speciﬁcations). We use linear interpo-
lation in order to create a smooth policy function ¯ q, necessary for an eﬃcient search
for the maximum likelihood parameters.
We ﬁnd the parameter vector that maximizes the likelihood by using numerical
search algorithms. We use two diﬀerent algorithms: a routine that we developed
that combines the simplex method with random jumps and the method of simulated
annealing by Goﬀe et al. (1992).
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